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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The concept of sharing commercial, industrial, and utility property tax base among the 
jurisdictions of a region is called “fiscal disparities.” This study examines the fiscal disparities in 
the Iron Range in northern Minnesota.  The Iron Range Fiscal Disparities (IFRD) program, 
established in 1996, was set up to share commercial-industrial tax-base in the region known as 
the “taconite assistance area.” 
 
Taconite assistance area tax base and Fiscal Disparities program have grown since 2001 
 
Since 2001 the taconite assistance area has experienced tax base growth at twice the rate of the 
state as a whole (80% and 42%, respectively). At the same time the area’s population has been 
unchanged while the state’s population has grown by 8%.  
 
Strong growth in commercial, industrial and utility values have caused the Iron Range Fiscal 
Disparities tax base sharing pool to grow by almost 600% since 2001. The amount of the area’s 
total tax base in the fiscal disparities pool is 3.7%, up from 1% in 2001. 
 
 
Year 
Contribution 
Tax Base % of 
Total Business 
Property 
Contribution 
Tax Base % of 
Total Tax Base 
% of Tax 
Base 
Shifted 
2001 4% 1.0% 0.5% 
2013 22% 3.7% 1.7% 
 
Even though 3.7% of the area tax base went into the tax base sharing pool in 2013, the program 
redistributed only 1.7% of area tax base.  This is because all municipalities that contributed tax 
base to the pool also receive tax base back out of the pool, so the amount of actual redistribution 
is lower than the amount of tax base in the pool. 
Fiscal Disparities program is smaller than taconite production tax programs 
Jurisdictions in St. Louis County are the greatest net recipients from the fiscal disparities pool, 
receiving more tax base from the program than they contribute. Conversely, Itasca County is the 
largest net contributor to the pool. The $13 million of property taxes distributed through the 
program in 2013 was less than the amount of taconite homestead property tax credits ($16 
million), taconite aids to local governments ($37 million) and IRRRB grants and loans to local 
governments ($25 million), which are all funded from taconite production tax revenues. The 
table below compares where 2013 fiscal disparities dollars and taconite tax production dollars 
came from to where the proceeds were distributed (in thousands of dollars). 
 
 
Table 1 
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County 
Taconite 
Aid 
Taconite 
Credits 
IRRRB 
Grants & 
Loans 
Fiscal 
Disparities 
Distribution  
Levy 
Fiscal 
Disparities 
Contribution  
Levy 
Production 
Tax 
Contribution 
Aitkin  190 910 0 230 -530 0 
Cook 1,150 530 750 90 -660 0 
Crow Wing 390 1,170 380 590 -590 0 
Itasca 5,030 3,780 4,180 2,910 -5,470 -7,450 
Lake 3,280 1,140 2,930 570 -1,240 -6,300 
St. Louis 27,030 8,450 17,020 9,100 -5,000 -80,450 
Totals 37,070 15,980 25,260 13,490 -13,490 -94,200 
(000s) 
 
The program outcomes can be unpredictable 
 
The program uses previous-year tax base and tax rate data for some calculations. This can cause 
contributions and distributions to appear unpredictable. Under the current calendar for setting 
assessed values and tax rates it would be administratively difficult to eliminate these data lags. 
 
The repeal of the market value homestead credit and replacement with the homestead market 
value exclusion in 2011 had two effects on the program. First, it changed the relative property 
wealth of communities because some lost more tax base from the exclusion than others. 
Municipalities with lower homestead values had more of their homestead tax base excluded from 
taxation. This shifted more of the fiscal disparities distribution to communities with below 
average tax base beginning in 2013. Second, many of the municipalities that lost tax base from 
the exclusion increased their local tax rates in 2012 to maintain their levies. This caused the 
fiscal disparities area-wide tax rate to increase from 142% in 2012 to 169% in 2013. Generally, 
the jurisdictions that are the largest recipients of fiscal disparities distribution have among the 
lowest tax bases and highest tax rates in the area. The exclusion’s impact was most pronounced 
on the tax base of biggest net recipients. 
Table 2 
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IRON RANGE FISCAL DISPARITIES STUDY 
 
Introduction 
The concept of sharing commercial, industrial, and utility property tax base among the 
jurisdictions of a region is called “fiscal disparities.”  
 
This particular study examines the fiscal disparities in the Iron Range in northern Minnesota.  
The Iron Range Fiscal Disparities (IFRD) program, established in 1996, was set up to share 
commercial-industrial tax-base in the region known as the “taconite assistance area.” 
 
The 2013 tax bill1 required the Commissioner of Revenue, in coordination with the 
Commissioner of the Iron Range Resources and Rehabilitation Board (IRRRB), to conduct a 
study of the Iron Range fiscal disparities program. The study identifies: 
1. trends in population, property tax base, property tax rates, and contribution and 
distribution capacity across the region; 
2. the interaction between the program and the distribution of property tax aids and credits, 
taconite aid, and IRRRB funding across the region; 
3. the impact of state tax policy changes on the fiscal disparities program; 
4. the unpredictability of the program's distribution and causes of the unpredictability; and 
5. issues for policy makers to consider. 
 
Principle findings 
• The Iron Range fiscal disparities tax base sharing pool grew significantly in the past 
decade due to strong growth in the commercial, industrial and utility tax base. 
• Jurisdictions in St. Louis County are the greatest net recipients from the fiscal disparities 
pool, receiving more tax base from the program than they contribute. Conversely, Itasca 
County is the largest net contributor to the pool. 
• The $13 million of property taxes distributed through the program in 2013 was less than 
the amount of taconite homestead property tax credits ($16 million), taconite aids to local 
governments ($37 million) and IRRRB grants and loans to local governments ($25 
million), which are all funded from taconite production tax revenues. 
• Data lags from using previous year numbers in the fiscal disparities calculations can 
cause contributions and distributions to sometimes change unexpectedly. 
• The repeal of the market value homestead credit and replacement with the homestead 
market value exclusion in 2011 changed how the tax base is distributed. It also 
contributed to the area-wide tax rate increasing from 142% to 169%, which increased 
taxes on some business property. 
 
 
                                                             
1 2013 Regular Session, Chapter 143, Article 11, Section 9 
7 
 
Fiscal Disparities Program Goals 
1. Support for a regional approach to development 
Tax-base sharing in a region spreads the fiscal benefit of business development spawned 
by regional facilities such as shopping centers, airports, freeway interchanges, and sports 
stadiums. It also may make tax-base sharing communities more willing to accept low tax-
yield regional facilities such as parks.  
2. Equalization in the distribution of fiscal resources in a region 
Communities with low tax bases must impose higher tax rates to deliver the same 
services as communities with higher tax bases. These high tax rates make communities 
with below-average tax base less attractive places for businesses to locate or expand in, 
exacerbating the problem. Sharing business tax base can reduce this effect. 
3. Reduction in competition for commercial-industrial development 
Communities generally believe that some kinds of business properties pay more in taxes 
than it costs to provide services to them. This encourages local communities to compete 
for properties by providing tax concessions or extra services to businesses, which can 
weaken the fiscal condition of the local community. Tax base sharing reduces the 
incentive for this competition. 
How Fiscal Disparities Works 
Each municipality in the program area contributes 40 percent of the growth of its commercial, 
industrial and utility property tax base since 1995 to an area-wide tax base sharing pool. This 
contribution value is not available for taxation by the jurisdictions where the property is located. 
 
Each municipality receives a share of the area-wide tax base sharing pool through a formula 
based on its share of the area’s population and its relative property tax wealth (tax base per 
capita). The municipality is allowed to tax this distribution value at the same rate as the tax rate 
paid by its residents. All taxing jurisdictions whose boundaries encompass the municipality are 
also allowed to tax the municipality’s distribution value (i.e., counties, school districts, and 
special taxing districts). 
A uniform area-wide rate is applied to the tax base in the pool. Proceeds from the pool pay a 
portion of municipal, county, school and special district levies. 
 
Commercial, industrial and utility properties pay a portion of their tax at the local rate and a 
portion at the area-wide rate. The property tax statement for each property has a local portion and 
an area-wide portion, based on the relative amount of the tax base that is contributed versus the 
relative amount that is retained for the municipality where the property is located. 
 
St. Louis County administers the Iron Range Fiscal Disparities program. 
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A similar program has been in place in the 7-county Twin Cities metropolitan area since 1971. 
Both programs use the same factors and formulas. See appendix 2 for a list of resources that 
provide further detail. 
 
Taconite Assistance Area 
 
The taconite assistance area in which the fiscal disparities program operates is comprised of 15 
school districts in portions of 7 northeastern counties. About 190 cities and townships are partly 
or fully within the boundaries of the area. See appendix 1 for a map of school districts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
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Taconite Assistance Area Counties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 1. Trends in population, property tax base, property tax rates, and contribution and 
distribution capacity across the region. 
 
A. Population  
The population of the taconite assistance area declined slightly (168,246 to 167,629) from 2001 
to 2012 (see table below). The portion of the area in Crow Wing County saw the greatest 
population percentage increase (+4.7%), while the area in St. Louis County decreased the most  
(-2.9%). 
Across the area 108 cities/towns decreased in population and 82 increased in population. Over 
this same period the state population increased by almost 8%.  A small portion of unorganized 
township in Koochiching County is part of the taconite assistance area.  The 2012 taconite 
assistance area population of Koochiching County was 78, but this portion is excluded for the 
purposes of this report. 
Figure 2 
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Population 
Taconite Assistance Area 
County 2001 2012 
% Change                   
2001-12 
Aitkin 9,732 9,968 2.4% 
Cook 5,175 5,190 0.3% 
Crow Wing 18,071 18,927 4.7% 
Itasca 40,303 41,273 2.4% 
Koochiching - - - 
Lake 11,083 10,815 -2.4% 
St. Louis 83,882 81,456 -2.9% 
Area Total 168,246 167,629 -0.4% 
Statewide 4,977,976 5,368,972 7.9% 
 
B. Property Tax Base  
 
Tax Base 
Taconite Assistance Area 
  (000's)     
      % Change 
County 2001 2013 2001-13 
Aitkin 7,703 17,705 130% 
Cook 8,107 16,387 102% 
Crow Wing 21,371 41,298 93% 
Itasca 33,200 53,560 61% 
Lake 7,272 17,117 135% 
St. Louis 41,421 68,171 65% 
Area Total 119,073 214,239 80% 
Statewide 3,671,539 5,210,992 42% 
 
Taconite assistance area tax base growth outpaced the statewide average from 2001 to 2013 (see 
table 4). Area tax base increased by 80% while the statewide property tax base increased by 
42%. The portions of the area in Itasca County increased by 61%, the least of the area counties. 
Only 8 municipalities decreased in property tax base from 2001 to 2013.  Seventeen 
communities more than doubled their property tax base from 2001 to 2013. 
 
Table 3 
Table 4 
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Tax Base Growth by County. Figure 3 shows tax base change by county. State-enacted 
property tax reform resulted in declines from 2001 to 2002. All counties experienced strong 
growth throughout the 2000’s. The Great Recession caused tax base declines and the 2011 repeal 
of the market value homestead credit and replacement with the homestead market value 
exclusion contributed to the reductions (more on this beginning on page 27). 
 
 
Tax Base Growth by Property Class. Throughout the 2000’s seasonal recreational residential 
properties (cabins) and homesteads were the greatest contributors to area tax base growth. 
Beginning in 2010 public utility values increased by 71% while other classes declined in value. 
(see figure 4 below)  
Figure 3 
Figure 4 
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C. Taconite Mining Production  
Taconite mining is a core industry of the area, along with timber and tourism. Production taxes 
on taconite mining fund property tax relief and local development projects. Taconite production 
taxes are taxes paid by mining companies in lieu of property taxes. Table 5 shows that since 
2002 the amount of taconite produced hovered between 34 and 39 million tons, with the 
exception of 2009 where production dropped to 17 million tons. Taconite production is projected 
to be stable over the next few years. Growth in the production of iron nuggets and iron ore 
concentrates will add to total production in the coming years.  
 
Taconite Production Tonnage by Year (millions) 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
31.6 37.5 34.3 39.4 39.5 38.9 38.0 39.2 17.1 35.0 38.9 39.0 
 
 
 
D. Fiscal Disparities Capacity 
The size of the fiscal disparities tax base 
sharing pool grew by almost 600% since 
2001 to about $8 million.  There have only 
been two years since 2003 in which the 
pool grew by less than 13% (see table 6). 
The increases are tied directly to the growth 
in value of commercial, industrial and 
utility properties.  
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Fiscal 
Disparities Tax 
Base (000's) 
% Change 
2001 $1,191   
2002 878 -26% 
2003 1,413 61% 
2004 1,898 34% 
2005 2,247 18% 
2006 2,625 17% 
2007 3,015 15% 
2008 3,427 14% 
2009 4,462 30% 
2010 5,359 20% 
2011 5,647 5% 
2012 6,372 13% 
2013 7,960 25% 
2014 8,109 2% 
Table 5
Table 6 
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Fiscal Disparities Share of Total Tax Base. The average range municipality contributes 22% of 
its commercial, industrial and public utility value to the tax base sharing pool, up from just 4% in 
2001. Figure 5 shows the growth in the total area tax base and the fiscal disparities tax base 
sharing pool since 2001.  
 
 
Note: NTC stands for Net Tax Capacity (tax base) 
The amount of the area’s total tax base in the fiscal disparities pool is 3.7%, up from 1% in 2001. 
 
Year 
Contribution 
Tax Base % of 
Total Business 
Property 
Contribution 
Tax Base % of 
Total Tax Base 
% of Tax 
Base 
Shifted 
2001 4% 1.0% 0.5% 
2013 22% 3.7% 1.7% 
 
Even though 3.7% of the area tax base went into the tax base sharing pool in 2013, the program 
redistributed only 1.7% of area tax base.  This is because all municipalities that contributed tax 
Figure 5 
Table 7 
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base to the pool also receive tax base back out of the pool, so the amount of actual redistribution 
is lower than the amount of tax base in the pool. 
 
E. Contribution/Distribution Capacity 2001-2014 
In 2001 Lake County was the largest net contributor, while Itasca County was a small net 
contributor. St. Louis County was the largest net recipient, receiving 1.5 times as much tax base 
as it contributed. Since 2001 Itasca County has become the largest net contributor and St. Louis 
County is the largest net recipient, receiving almost twice the tax base it contributes to the pool 
in 2014.  
 
 
Net Contribution by County 
2001 and 2014 
2001 Aitkin Cook 
Crow  
Wing Itasca Lake St. Louis 
Contribution Capacity 25,425 59,049 95,232 281,824 206,776 522,535 
Distribution Capacity 35,441 10,579 54,216 259,528 67,947 752,120 
Net Contribution 10,016 -48,470 -41,016 -22,296 -138,829 229,585 
2014 Aitkin Cook 
Crow  
Wing Itasca Lake St. Louis 
Contribution Capacity 314,963 391,702 348,836 3,226,650 728,723 2,949,108 
Distribution Capacity 249,564 66,320 407,968 1,588,201 417,702 5,224,170 
Net Contribution -65,399 -325,382 59,132 -1,638,449 -311,021 2,275,062 
Note: negative net contribution signifies  on a  whole the county is losing tax base 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
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Compared to 2001, Itasca County is now home to more of the largest net contributors. 
 
 
The list of largest net recipients is similar from 2001 to 2014 but with the growth of the program 
the amount of tax base received grew significantly.  
 
 
Impact as a percentage of tax base. Tables 11 and 11.1 show the largest net contributors and 
net recipients as a percent of tax base. These tables show how much smaller or larger the local 
tax base is due to the program. There are four municipalities, all townships in Itasca County, that 
lose more than 10% of their tax base. There are eight municipalities whose tax base is increased 
by more than 40%. 
 
County City/Township
Net 
Contribution County City/Township
Net 
Contribution
Lake Unorganized -66,262 Itasca City of Cohasset -909,283
Lake City of Two Harbors -64,004 Itasca City of Grand Rapids -678,440
St Louis City of Ely -42,835 Itasca Town of Blackberry -197,964
Cook City of Grand Marais -31,992 Lake Unorganized -191,711
Itasca City of Grand Rapids -27,747 St Louis Town of Arrowhead -151,991
Itasca Town of Blackberry -27,129 St Louis City of Mountain Iron -149,499
Lake City of Beaver Bay -19,603 Itasca City of Coleraine -135,937
Itasca Town of Grand Rapids -19,207 Itasca City of LaPrairie -120,693
Itasca City of Nashwauk -16,964 Itasca Town of Wawina -104,843
Lake Town of Silver Creek -15,891 Itasca Town of Feeley -92,365
2001 2014
County City/Township Net Received County City/Township Net Received
St Louis City of Virginia 85,434 St Louis City of Hibbing 738,431
St Louis City of Hibbing 66,711 St Louis City of Chisholm 633,309
St Louis City of Eveleth 36,827 St Louis City of Eveleth 437,950
St Louis City of Chisholm 26,221 St Louis City of Virginia 372,771
St Louis City of Aurora 24,500 St Louis City of Aurora 160,902
Lake City of Silver Bay 21,369 Itasca City of Keewatin 160,883
Itasca Unorganized 15,046 St Louis City of Gilbert 154,617
St Louis City of Gilbert 14,660 Crow Wing City of Crosby 128,062
Itasca City of Keewatin 14,118 St Louis City of Buhl 116,411
St Louis City of Babbitt 13,123 Itasca City of Marble 96,508
2001 2014
Table 9 
Table 10 
Table 9.1 
Table 10.1 
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Net Contributors     Net Recipients 
 
 
Tax base differentials are still big after the program. The program significantly impacts the 
tax base of many communities. It generally increases the tax base of communities with below-
average tax base and decreases the tax base of communities with above-average tax base. Yet, 
even with the program, the average per capita tax base of the largest net contributors is more than 
four times larger than that of the largest net recipients. 
 
 
  
Average Tax Base  
Per Capita (2013) 
Top 20 Net Contributors* 1,543 
Top 20 Net Recipients 376 
Taconite Assistance  
Area Average 1,326 
 
 *Excludes the city of Grand Rapids, which has a tax base of 784 per capita. 
 
County City/Township
2013 Fiscal 
Disparities 
Impact County City/Township
2013 Fiscal 
Disparities 
Impact
ITASCA WAWINA TWP -20% ITASCA KEEWATIN +67%
ITASCA BLACKBERRY TWP -14% ST LOUIS MCKINLEY +56%
ITASCA SAGO TWP -10% ST LOUIS KINNEY +55%
ITASCA FEELEY TWP -10% ST LOUIS CHISHOLM +52%
ST LOUIS KELSEY TWP -9% ST LOUIS MEADOWLANDS +50%
ST LOUIS BASSETT TWP -8% ITASCA MARBLE +48%
ITASCA COLERAINE -8% ST LOUIS EVELETH +45%
ST LOUIS ARROWHEAD TWP -8% ST LOUIS BUHL +43%
ITASCA LAPRAIRIE -8% ITASCA BOVEY +36%
ITASCA COHASSET -8% ITASCA CALUMET +35%
ST LOUIS MCDAVITT TWP -7% ST LOUIS AURORA +29%
ITASCA GRAND RAPIDS -7% ST LOUIS GILBERT +26%
ST LOUIS MOUNTAIN IRON -7% ITASCA EFFIE +22%
ST LOUIS FIELD TWP -6% ST LOUIS WINTON +21%
LAKE BEAVER BAY -6% CROW WINGIRONTON +19%
ST LOUIS FAIRBANKS TWP -6% ST LOUIS BROOKSTON +16%
AITKIN AITKIN -6% AITKIN PALISADE +15%
ST LOUIS KUGLER TWP -6% CROW WINGCROSBY +13%
COOK SCHROEDER TWP -6% ST LOUIS EMBARRASS TWP +13%
ST LOUIS GREAT SCOTT TWP -5% ITASCA BIGFORK +13%
Table 11 
Table 12 
Table 11.1 
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Net Contribution/Net Received by School District 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
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F. Property Tax Rates 
Overall, area tax rates follow the economy. As market values grew through the 2000’s local tax 
rates (the sum of the municipal, county, school district and special taxing district rates) steadily 
dropped from an average of 122% in 2002 to an average of 78% in 2009. As the recession 
reduced property values the average tax rate grew to 95% in 2013.  The area-wide fiscal 
disparities rate followed the same general pattern but was typically 50 percentage points higher 
than the average local rate. 
 
Year 
Average Local 
Tax Rate 
Area-wide Fiscal 
Disparities Rate 
2001 121% 158% 
2002 122% 206% 
2003 121% 158% 
2004 112% 162% 
2005 101% 154% 
2006 95% 145% 
2007 90% 143% 
2008 82% 142% 
2009 78% 133% 
2010 80% 131% 
2011 83% 138% 
2012 91% 142% 
2013 95% 169% 
2014 
estimated 98% 155% 
 
Why the big difference? There are two main reasons: 
1. The area-wide fiscal disparities rate is based on the previous year tax rates of 
municipalities where the tax base is distributed, not where it comes from. Areas receiving 
additional tax base from fiscal disparities tend to have below-average tax base and higher 
average local tax rates than the municipalities that contribute most of the tax base to the 
pool. 
 
2. School referendum levies are partly paid through the fiscal disparities program, which 
increases the area-wide fiscal disparities rate. 
Table 13 
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The average local tax rate is lower in part because it includes townships with lower tax rates and 
little commercial, industrial or utility property. So comparing the average local tax rate to the 
area-wide fiscal disparities rate overstates the rate gap faced by the typical business property; 
most of this property is in municipalities that have higher tax rates than the many townships with 
little business property. 
To account for this, table 14 shows a comparison of the difference between the area-wide fiscal 
disparities rate and what the average local tax rate would be if the contribution capacity paid the 
local tax rate.  In 2011 the difference was 26 percentage points. In 2012 the difference decreases 
to 15 percentage points but increases in 2013 to 47 percentage points. This change is in large part 
due to the repeal of the market value homestead credit and replacement with the homestead 
market value exclusion.  
 
Year 
Contributors'  
Local Tax 
Rate 
Area-wide 
Fiscal 
Disparities 
Rate Difference 
2011 113% 138% 26% 
2012 126% 142% 15% 
2013 122% 169% 47% 
2014 127% 155% 28% 
 
The difference will decline to an estimated 28% in 2014 as the area-wide fiscal disparities rate 
drops from 169% to 155%. The drop is the direct result of the previous year’s increase in the 
area-wide tax rate. The increase in the area-wide fiscal disparities rate in 2013 increased the 
amount of fiscal disparities levy the recipient jurisdictions received, which in turn reduced the 
amount of local levy and the local tax rates. More on this in the ‘Unpredictability’ section on 
page 29. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14 
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G. Tax shift impacts of the program 
The program moderates differences in tax base across the area by redistributing tax base from 
places that have seen growth in their business property values to places with low overall property 
value. Redistribution of the tax base helps equalize tax rates. That is, the difference between tax 
rates in high-rate jurisdictions and low-rate jurisdictions are lower than they would be without 
the fiscal disparities program. 
 
The program also shifts some taxes onto business property from most other property types. For 
example, the program reduces homestead taxes by 3.2% and increases business property taxes by 
4.3%. 
 
 
 
(000's) 
 
Property Type 
Tax Without 
Fiscal 
Disparities 
Actual  
2013 
Tax Change 
Percent 
Change 
Resident Homestead 61,963 59,991 -1,972 -3.2% 
Apartment,  
Non-Homestead 16,210 15,566 -644 -4.0% 
Farm, Timber 23,981 23,922 -59 -0.2% 
Commercial, Industrial, 
Utility, Railroad, 
Personal 
71,958 75,047 3,089 4.3% 
Cabins 54,032 54,196 164 0.3% 
 
Note: Based on payable year 2013 simulation of property taxes without the program, assuming no 
change in levies. 
Table 15 
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Section 2. The interaction between the program and other revenue sources. 
State and Local Property Tax Related Revenue Sources. Table 16 compares the fiscal 
disparities distribution levy to property taxes, property tax credits, selected general purpose aids, 
and grants and loans from the IRRRB. The fiscal disparities program was in its infancy in 2001. 
It grew faster than other revenue sources in the past 12 years in percentage terms, but is still the 
smallest of the five categories. A description of these revenue sources can be found in Appendix 
3. 
 
(000's) 
Taconite 
Assistance Area 
Fiscal 
Disparities 
Distribution 
Levy Local Levy Credit Total 1 Aid Total 2 
IRRRB Grants 
& Loans 
2001 
                          
1,850  
                  
118,780  
                 
28,790  
                
58,460  
                       
13,140  
2002 
                          
1,820  
                    
95,070  
                 
28,500  
                
62,130  
                       
19,000  
2003 
                          
2,230  
                  
106,740  
                 
29,540  
                
55,860  
                         
4,210  
2004 
                          
3,030  
                  
111,170  
                 
29,820  
                
51,400  
                       
11,450  
2005 
                          
3,460  
                  
116,000  
                 
29,940  
                
56,170  
                       
18,520  
2006 
                          
3,820  
                  
125,410  
                 
30,180  
                
57,930  
                       
17,220  
2007 
                          
4,300  
                  
138,210  
                 
30,220  
                
58,770  
                         
9,230  
2008 
                          
4,880  
                  
146,410  
                 
30,020  
                
54,650  
                       
32,950  
2009 
                          
5,950  
                  
156,760  
                 
29,530  
                
62,730  
                       
22,010  
2010 
                          
6,990  
                  
172,450  
                 
29,580  
                
57,300  
                       
14,510  
2011 
                          
7,670  
                  
177,210  
                 
29,800  
                
57,820  
                       
20,390  
2012 
                          
9,070  
                  
192,430  
                 
16,940  
                
57,480  
                       
20,310  
2013 
                        
13,490  
                  
191,990  
                 
16,770  
                
64,030  
                       
25,260  
2001-2013 change 
Dollar 11,640  73,210  (12,020) 5,570  12,120  
Percentage 630% 62% -42% 10% 92% 
 
1 The state repealed the market value homestead credit and replaced it with the homestead  market value 
exclusion  beginning in 2012 
2 Aids include LGA, CPA, Taconite, PILT, and Utility Aid 
Table 16 
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Local Property Tax Related Revenues. Table 17 narrows the revenue sources to those that are 
from local, not state, sources. Local property tax levies for municipalities, counties, schools, and 
special taxing districts make up two thirds of the total ($1,145 per capita) while fiscal-disparity 
levies account for just 5% of the total. The other three local revenue sources (taconite aids, 
taconite credits, and IRRRB grants and loans) represent 29% of the total and are funded from 
taconite production tax revenues. 
 
Revenue (2013) Per capita $ % Share 
Local Levy 1,145 66% 
Fiscal Disparities Distribution 
Levy 81 5% 
Taconite Aid 221 13% 
Taconite Credits 95 5% 
IRRRB Grants & Loans 194 11% 
 
The reliance on property taxes varies by county.  Figure 7 shows the distribution of these local 
revenue sources for 2013 for the portion of each county that is in the relief area. Aitkin and Crow 
Wing counties had the highest proportion of local property taxes, while Lake and St. Louis 
counties had the highest proportion of other revenue sources. 
 
Table 17 
Figure 7 
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Property tax reliance varies more at the municipal level. One reason is that IRRRB grants and 
loans are usually for specific one-time projects, so the amount of IRRRB funds received by a 
municipality may change more from year to year than the other revenue sources.  See appendix 4 
for a list of local revenue sources for cities and townships . 
By county for 2013, table 18 shows the total dollars by local revenue source other than local 
property taxes, and the sources of those revenues. This table provides a snapshot of the 
redistribution of revenues through the fiscal disparities program and the redistribution of 
revenues through the programs funded from the taconite production tax (taconite aids and credits 
and IRRRB grants and loans).  
Considering fiscal disparities alone, Itasca County is the largest net contributor, contributing $5.5 
million to the pool and receiving $2.9 million out of the pool. Aitkin, Cook and Lake counties 
have smaller net contributions. St. Louis County is the largest net recipient, receiving $9.1 
million out of the pool while contributing $5 million to the pool. The other three revenue sources 
are funded through the taconite production tax, which is primarily generated in St. Louis County 
($80.4 of $94.2 million). The other five counties receive more from these three programs than 
they contribute in production tax revenues. 
2013 Local Revenue Sources Taconite Assistance Area by County 
 
County 
Taconite 
Aid 
Taconite 
Credits 
IRRRB 
Grants & 
Loans 
Fiscal 
Disparities 
Distribution  
Levy 
Fiscal 
Disparities 
Contribution  
Levy 
Production 
Tax 
Contribution 
Aitkin  190 910 0 230 -530 0 
Cook 1,150 530 750 90 -660 0 
Crow Wing 390 1,170 380 590 -590 0 
Itasca 5,030 3,780 4,180 2,910 -5,470 -7,450 
Lake 3,280 1,140 2,930 570 -1,240 -6,300 
St. Louis 27,030 8,450 17,020 9,100 -5,000 -80,450 
Totals 37,070 15,980 25,260 13,490 -13,490 -94,200 
 
Note: Includes all levels of local governments (county, city/town, school, special taxing districts). 
Production tax revenues also go to IRRRB operations, facilities, grants, loans and other investments not 
assigned to a particular jurisdiction.  The total production tax contribution does not include the $8.4 million 
state contribution. 
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State revenues also address local tax base disparities 
Various state aid payment programs have indirect impacts on fiscal disparities. Local 
Government Aid (LGA) to cities is a general purpose aid that can be used for any lawful 
expenditure and is also intended to be used for property tax relief. Tax base is used in the LGA 
formula as a local measure of ability to pay and directs more aid to cities with relatively lower 
tax bases. The table below shows the difference in LGA distributions to taconite assistance area 
cities. 
 
LGA to Cities 
Number of  
Cities 
Tax Base  
per  
capita 
Average Local  
Tax Rate 
LGA  
per  
capita 
Net Recipients - Fiscal Disparities 30 $354 156% $435 
Net Contributors - Fiscal Disparities 17 $1,331 107% $147 
All Taconite Assistance Area Cities 47 $715 123% $329 
 
The 30 net recipient cities with below average tax base per capita and higher than average local 
tax rates receive almost three times more LGA per capita compared to net contributor cities 
($435 per capita vs. $147 per capita). Similar to fiscal disparities, LGA provides additional non-
local revenue sources to cities with lower local tax bases. 
If LGA meets its intention of lowering local property taxes and property tax rates, there would be 
an impact on the area-wide fiscal disparities tax rate. If LGA lowers local property tax rates in 
net recipient cities (which the area-wide tax rate is based on), then net contributor cities with 
local tax rates below the area-wide tax rate benefit from a lower area-wide tax rate. 
County Program Aid (CPA) and Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) also compensate for low tax 
base or tax base that becomes tax exempt and are distributed to counties. 
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Section 3. The impact of state tax policy changes on the fiscal disparities program 
This study examines three state tax policy changes that had an impact on the fiscal disparities 
program: the 2001 Big Plan property tax reform, the 2007 utility valuation rule change, and the 
2011 enactment of the homestead market value exclusion. 
A. The 2001 Big Plan Reforms 
In 2001 the state enacted a property tax reform package that: 
 replaced a large share of school levies with state aid,  
 reduced the classification rates for commercial, industrial, utility and high-value 
residential property, 
 established a statewide property tax on businesses and cabins, 
 changed state aids and credits, and 
 replaced transit levies with state aid. 
The reform’s impact on the fiscal disparities program was mostly due to the compression of 
classification rates. Total tax base declined by 17% across the taconite assistance area. 
Commercial, industrial and utility net tax capacities declined almost 38% from 2001 to 2002, and 
did not return to 2001 levels until 2011. 
The drop in commercial, industrial and utility tax capacity in 2002 caused a 26% decline in the 
amount of tax base redistributed through the fiscal disparities program from 2001 to 2002. This 
reduction did not reduce fiscal disparities levies, as the law makes a one-time adjustment for 
classification changes. It did, however, create a one-time 30% increase in the area-wide fiscal 
disparities rate that increased property taxes paid in 2002 by business property across the region.  
 
Taconite 
Assistance  
Area Tax Base 
2001 Tax 
Base 
2002 Tax 
Base Change 
Aitkin 7,703,160 7,006,848 -9% 
Cook 8,106,517 6,587,678 -19% 
Crow Wing 21,371,238 17,980,122 -16% 
Itasca 33,199,651 25,512,293 -23% 
Koochiching 2,872,787 2,561,377 -11% 
Lake 7,271,571 6,324,000 -13% 
St. Louis 41,421,033 35,582,866 -14% 
Total Assistance 
Area Tax Base 121,945,957 101,555,184 -17% 
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The reduction in the overall tax base was short-lived, however, with 2003 distributions 
exceeding the 2001 amounts.  
 
 
 
 
 
B. The 2007 utility valuation rule change 
The department of revenue revised its rule governing the valuation of utility property in 2007. 
The new valuation method reduced taconite assistance area utility property by an estimated 15%. 
The new rule was phased in over 3 years, from 2008 to 2010. The impact of the new rule on total 
taconite assistance area utility value was masked by large new investments in utility property that 
continued through 2013. Some municipalities, however, have not recovered the value they lost 
from the rule change (e.g. Aitkin and Babbitt). 
Figure 7 
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C. The 2011 repeal of the market value homestead credit and replacement with the homestead 
market value exclusion 
In 2011 the state replaced a homestead credit with a homestead exclusion that excludes a portion 
of a homestead’s value from taxation. The exclusion is largest for a $76,000 home and gets 
smaller as home value increases.  
The switch to the exclusion had two effects. First, it changed the relative property wealth of 
communities because some lost more tax base from the exclusion than others. Municipalities 
with lower homestead values had more of their homestead tax base excluded from taxation. This 
shifted more of the fiscal disparities distribution to poorer communities beginning in 2013. 
Figure 8 shows that the exclusion had a bigger impact on the total tax base of communities with 
a higher share of their tax base in homestead property, and how that translated into a larger 
increase in fiscal disparities distribution. 
  
Figure 8 
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Area-wide 
Fiscal 
Disparities 
Rate
Pay 2011 138%
Pay 2012 142%
Pay 2013 169%
Pay 2014 155%
  
Location 
Residential 
Homestead % 
Share of  
Tax Base 1 
Total Tax 
Base Change 
2 
Fiscal 
Disparities 
Tax Base 
Change 3 
Morse Township 34% -1% +4% 
Mountain Iron 43% -6% +13% 
Grand Rapids 42% -7% +15% 
Hibbing 57% -18% +29% 
Eveleth 62% -20% +28% 
Chisholm 70% -29% +52% 
 
1 payable year 2011 share of tax base 
2 tax base change between 2011-12 
3 tax base change between 2012-13 
 
Second, many of the municipalities that lost tax base from the exclusion increased their local tax 
rates in 2012 to maintain their levies. This caused a significant increase in the fiscal disparities 
area-wide tax rate and in the total levy in 2013 (previous year rates are used to calculate the area-
wide fiscal disparities rate). Generally, the jurisdictions that are the largest recipients of fiscal 
disparities distribution have among the lowest tax bases and highest tax rates in the area. The 
exclusion’s impact was most pronounced on the tax base of biggest net recipients. 
The increase in the area-wide tax rate in 2013 is a result of 
several factors, including changes to local levies and assessed 
market values. A department analysis of the exclusion holding all 
other factors constant indicates that about 20 of the 27 point 
increase in the area-wide fiscal disparities rate from 2012 to 2013 
can be attributed to the exclusion.  
The area-wide fiscal disparities rate moderated in 2014. The 
exclusion shifted additional fiscal disparities tax base to many of 
the largest net recipients in 2013. This additional distribution enabled them to reduce the local 
share of their levy, reducing their 2013 local rates. These lower local rates flowed through to the 
area-wide fiscal disparities rate in 2014.  
  
Table 21 
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Section 4. Program Unpredictability 
One of the principles of good tax policy is stability. When taxes or tax-related programs are 
unpredictable they can cause hardship for taxpayers and budgeting challenges for governments.  
This report examines four sources of unpredictability in the fiscal disparities program: 
contribution capacity, distribution capacity, the use of previous-year tax rates, and 
unpredictability from the business taxpayer’s perspective. 
Contribution capacity. A municipality’s contribution to the pool equals 40% of the growth in 
its commercial/industrial/utility (CIU) value above its 1995 amount. A municipality’s 
contribution generally rises and falls with overall changes in CIU values. However, the program 
bases a municipality’s contribution on its CIU values from the previous year rather than the 
current year. Because of this data lag, a municipality enjoys the full benefit of growth in CIU tax 
base when it first becomes taxable. In the second year the municipality’s contribution to the 
fiscal disparities pool increases and the share of the municipality’s tax base that remains 
available locally is reduced by 40% of the new growth.  
 
Figure 9 shows an example of this in Wawina Township in Itasca County. The blue bar 
represents the local tax base per capita after contribution to fiscal disparities. The red bar 
represents the contribution to the fiscal disparities pool. From 2004 to 2009 the township’s CIU 
tax base was less than its 1995 base amount so it made no contributions to the pool. A major 
pipeline project through the township resulted in significant growth in the township’s tax base 
for taxes payable in 2012. In 2013 the townships contribution increased to reflect that growth. 
The township had to adjust to the lower local tax base in the second year.  
 
Figure 9 
30 
 
Figure 10 shows a similar pattern in the city of Grand Rapids. From 2008 to 2009 the local tax 
base expanded due to growth in its CIU value. As a result, in 2010 the fiscal disparities 
contribution increased. Local market values also fell that same year, creating a double-hit to the 
local tax base. The local tax base rebounded in 2011 but fell again in 2012 as a result of the 
repeal of the market value homestead credit and replacement with the homestead market value 
exclusion. The instability in the Grand Rapids tax base from 2008 to 2012 was caused by many 
factors, one factor being the impact of the fiscal disparities program. 
 
 
Under the current calendar for setting assessed values it would be administratively difficult to 
eliminate these lags in tax base changes being recognized in the calculation of fiscal disparities 
contribution capacity. 
Distribution capacity. The amount of tax base a jurisdiction receives from the pool varies from 
year to year based on its overall property value per capita compared to the average across the 
area. Every year municipalities’ tax base changes at varying rates, so there is always some 
amount of shifting of the distribution from year to year. In most years since 2002 the amount of 
tax base distributed by the pool grew from the previous year. This growth made decreases in the 
distribution share less problematic for municipalities that received a smaller share of the tax base 
sharing pool because most of them experienced smaller year-over-year increases instead of 
Figure 10 
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actual year-over-year decreases. However, in three of the past twelve years a large number of 
municipalities saw a decrease in their distribution capacity:  
1. Major tax reform enacted in 2001 resulted in a reduction in commercial/industrial/utility 
tax base that reduced the size of the fiscal disparities pool. This reform caused 154 of 190 
area municipalities (81%) to experience a decline in distribution tax base in 2002.  
2. In 2011 there was almost no growth in the pool, so the normal shifting of distribution 
among municipalities resulted in 51 municipalities with a decline.  
3. In 2012 there were 55 municipalities with a decline in distribution. 2012 was the first 
year in which the 2010 decennial census population figures were available. Many 
municipalities saw a significant change in their population from the 2009 state estimates 
to the 2010 census counts.2 Because the pool is distributed based on per capita tax base, a 
large decrease in population without a corresponding reduction in tax base will make a 
municipality appear more property wealthy compared to other area municipalities, 
reducing its distribution from the pool. 
4. In 2013 distribution was first affected by the change to the homestead market value 
exclusion. The exclusion shifted the share of the pool going to some of the biggest net 
recipient municipalities who lost the most tax base from the exclusion. The impact of this 
shift was masked by a 25% increase in the size of the pool in 2013; that is, many 
jurisdictions that received a smaller share of the pool in 2013 still saw an increase in the 
dollars of distribution because of the growth in the size of the pool.  
 
                                                             
2 Significant changes in population have occurred with previous decennial census population counts 
Figure 11 
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Use of previous-year tax rates. A jurisdiction’s fiscal disparities levy for a year is the product 
of its distribution capacity and its previous-year local tax rate. If a jurisdiction has an increase in 
its tax rate in one year, its fiscal disparities distribution levy increases in the following year. This 
increase in distribution levy in year two may lead to a decrease in the local portion of the levy 
(assuming the total levy remains the same) and therefore a decrease in the local tax rate in year 
two. That decrease in the tax rate in year two will lead to a decrease in the fiscal disparities 
distribution levy in year three, which may cause an increase in the local levy and the local tax 
rate. This cycle could continue for any number of years, with the share of a jurisdiction’s levy 
that is paid from the pool rising one year and falling the next.  
 
The repeal of the market value homestead credit and replacement with the homestead market 
value exclusion appears to have impacted a number of jurisdictions. The loss of tax base in 2012 
from the exclusion increased many local tax rates. This caused an increase in fiscal disparities 
distribution levies in 2013, which in turn reduced local levies and local tax rate in 2013. These 
lower local rates will yield lower fiscal disparities levies in 2014 and may cause these local tax 
rates to increase again.   
As with the tax base lag, under the current calendar for setting assessed values it would be 
administratively difficult to eliminate the lag in tax rates. 
 
Business taxpayer’s perspective. A business property owner’s tax bill can change for many 
reasons. The two most common reasons for a tax change are changes in local government levies 
and changes in the parcel’s value that vary from the change in the overall tax base. Fiscal 
disparities can also cause changes in the tax bill. Recall that a jurisdiction contributes 40% of the 
growth in its CIU value since 1995 to the pool. A portion of a business’s value equal to their 
municipality’s contribution share is taxed at the area-wide fiscal disparities rate, while the 
balance of the value is taxed at the local rate. If the area-wide fiscal disparities rate increases, the 
tax on business property increases regardless of local levy decisions. The area-wide fiscal 
disparities rate increased from 142% in 2012 to 169% in 2013. 
Additionally, changes in the contribution percentage can change a business’s tax bill.  Figure 12 
shows the Township of Sago, which did not contribute to the pool from 2002 to 2010 because its 
CIU values were below its 1995 base year level. Growth in utility value caused it to become a 
contributor again starting in 2012. Sago’s contribution percentage increased from 0% in 2011 to 
19% in 2013. 
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Table 23 shows the rates for Sago for 2011 and 2013. In 2011 a Sago business was taxed entirely 
at the local tax rate of 75% because the township did not contribute to the pool. By 2013 19% of 
the business’s value was taxed at the area-wide fiscal disparities rate of 169% and the rest at the 
local rate of 80%. The business’s resulting tax bill is the same as if the entire value were taxed at 
a 96% rate. So the growth in utility value caused the township to become a contributor to the 
program, which in turn caused all business property in the township to pay a portion of their 
value at the higher area-wide fiscal disparities rate. 
 
Township of Sago 2011 2013 
Area-wide Rate 138% 169% 
Local Rate 75% 80% 
Contribution Share* 0% 19% 
Effective rate for 
business taxpayers 75% 96% 
 
* Contribution share is based on previous year tax base. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 
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Transparency to taxpayers.  Fiscal Disparities can appear on tax statements as an additional tax 
rather than a substitute tax. Figure 13 shows a sample business property tax statement with the 
fiscal disparities line highlighted. Many business owners assume that if the Fiscal Disparities 
program were eliminated, their tax bill would be reduced by the amount shown on their tax 
statement. In reality, the tax base would return to their local municipality, county and school and 
the other portions of their tax bill would increase. Additional educational outreach efforts to 
business owners may improve understanding of the program and its impact.  
Example Property Tax Statement 
  
Figure 13 
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Section 5. Identification of issues for policy makers to consider.  
In light of the information laid out in this study, the following policy issues may be worth 
consideration: 
1. Program factors. The factors used in the taconite assistance area program (the 40% 
contribution, the exclusion from the program of existing commercial/industrial/utility tax 
base, the types of property included) that determine the amount of sharing are all based 
on the structure of the older Twin Cities area program. Having the two programs 
structured identically makes it easier for state policy makers to understand the programs 
and provide oversight. There may, however, be unique conditions in the taconite 
assistance area that warrant exploration. 
2. Local and area-wide tax rate differentials. In 2014, the area-wide fiscal disparities rate 
is estimated to be 28 percentage points higher than the typical local rate in contributor 
communities. In municipalities with low local tax rates and high contribution percentages 
the added taxes from the program can be significant.  
3. Transparency to taxpayers. Many policy makers perceive a lack of understanding about 
the program among the business taxpayers who pay fiscal disparities. Fiscal Disparities 
redirects a portion of a business property’s value to local governments other than the ones 
in which the property resides. The fiscal disparities tax is a substitute for having that 
value taxed by the local governments where the property resides. This substitute tax may 
be more or less than the tax that would be paid by the business if the property’s entire 
value were taxed locally, depending on whether the local tax rate is higher or lower than 
the fiscal disparities area-wide tax rate.   
 
Conclusion 
The Iron Range fiscal disparities tax base sharing pool grew in size in the past decade as 
commercial, industrial, and utility tax base expanded.  
By redistributing the tax base the program made tax base and tax rates more uniform across the 
region. About 3.7 percent of the area tax base is contributed to the program, although almost half 
of that tax base is distributed back to the same municipalities that contributed it. The program 
collected about $13 million in taxes in 2013, smaller than the amount of taconite homestead 
property tax credits ($16 million), taconite aids to local governments ($37 million) and IRRRB 
grants and loans to local governments ($25 million), which are all funded from taconite 
production tax revenues. 
The program’s distribution experienced some unpredictability which caused tax base changes for 
certain municipalities, especially in times of state tax policy change. Structurally, the program 
uses year-old tax rate and tax base data for some calculations, which can cause unpredictability 
in tax base contributions and tax distributions. 
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Business taxpayers’ property taxes are about 4.3% higher across the area because of the program, 
while residential taxes are lower. In municipalities with low local tax rates and high contribution 
percentages the added taxes from program can be more significant.  
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Appendix 1 
Taconite Assistance Area School Districts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 
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Appendix 2 
Additional Resources 
 
For a basic description of the program, see League of Minnesota Cities, “Fiscal Disparities 101,” 
December 2013. Available at www.lmc.org. 
 
For a more comprehensive description of the calculations involved in the program, see Steve 
Hinze and Karen Baker, House Research Department, Minnesota’s Fiscal Disparities Programs, 
January 2005. Available at www.house.mn. 
 
For up to date information on the metropolitan area fiscal disparities program, see the 
Metropolitan Council website: http://www.metrocouncil.org/Data-Maps/Fiscal-Disparities.aspx 
 
A 2012 study of the metropolitan fiscal disparities program included a more comprehensive 
bibliography of reports and research about the program. See TischlerBise, Study of the 
Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Program, February 2012. Available at 
www.revenue.state.mn.us. 
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Appendix 3 
Description of Revenue Sources 
1. Property tax aids include the following:  
- Local Government Aid (LGA) is a general purpose aid to cities that can be used for any 
lawful expenditure. It is also intended to be used for property tax relief by reducing the 
amount of revenue that is collected locally, through property tax or other means.  The 
LGA formula for cities changed many times since enacted in 1971. The current formula 
measures city need with factors including population and age of housing and compares 
this to a city’s ability to pay measured by local tax base. In general, the formula attempts 
to target aid to those cities with the lowest tax base and highest need. 
- County Program Aid (CPA) is a general purpose aid to counties that can be used for any 
lawful expenditure. It is also intended to be used for property tax relief by reducing the 
amount of revenue collected locally, through property tax or other means. Prior to 2004, 
counties received aid through a number of different programs. Beginning in 2004, the aid 
programs were combined into one general aid program.  The CPA appropriation is 
divided into two main pots: (1) need aid and (2) tax base equalization aid. The need aid is 
distributed proportionately based on a county’s measure of crime rate, poverty, and age-
adjusted population. The tax base equalization aid is distributed based on a county’s 
population and local tax base. In general, the formula attempts to target aid to those 
counties with the highest need and lowest tax base. 
- Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) provide compensation for the property taxes lost to 
local government when the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) acquires natural 
resource land for the state.  The state makes payments in lieu of taxes primarily to 
counties for certain DNR lands, county-administered other natural resource land, land 
utilization project land, and commissioner-administered natural land. 
- Utility Valuation Transition Aid (UVTA) compensate cities and towns with tax base 
reductions greater than four percent due to the implementation of a new rule pertaining to 
the assessment of utility property. 
2. Property tax credits include the following: 
- The Residential Market Value Homestead Credit was designed to reduce the tax on 
any property that was classified as homestead property. For agricultural homestead 
property, only the taxable market value of the house, garage and immediately 
surrounding one acre of land qualified for the credit.  The credit was based on a 
percentage of homestead market value, with a maximum credit of $304 which phases out 
to zero for homes valued above $413,780. The residential market value homestead credit 
was repealed effective beginning for taxes payable in 2012 and replaced with a market 
value exclusion. 
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- Market Value Agricultural Land Credit was designed to reduce the tax on agricultural 
homestead land beyond the house, garage and immediately surrounding one acre of land 
(or HGA). The credit is based on a percentage of land market value, with a maximum 
credit of $345 per homestead which reduces to $230 for agricultural land of $345,000 or 
more. 
- Taconite Homestead Credit reduces property tax paid by owner-occupied homesteads 
and farms within the Taconite Tax Relief Area.  The credit is equal to either 57 percent or 
66 percent of the homestead tax depending on the area of the taconite taxing district in 
which it is located. The maximum amount of this credit is $289.80 for homesteads 
receiving the 57 percent credit and $315.10 for those receiving the 66 percent credit.  The 
supplement credit is equivalent to the regular taconite credit but is provided to certain 
areas that are adjacent to the Taconite Tax Relief Area but face similar issues. 
3. Taconite aids include various distributions of proceeds from the taconite production tax to 
counties, school districts, cities and townships located throughout the taconite assistance area.  
For additional details refer to the Minnesota Mining Tax Guide or Minnesota Statutes chapter 
298.28. 
4. Iron Range Resources and Rehabilitation Board (IRRRB) funding includes grants and loans to 
support projects throughout the taconite assistance area including infrastructure improvements, 
economic development, culture and tourism, and education and training.  Funding is primarily 
from proceeds from the taconite production tax. 
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Appendix 4 
City/Township 2013 Local Revenue Sources, Percent of Total 
Note that reliance on specific revenue sources can vary from year to year. 
COUNTY CITY-TOWN NAME 
Local 
Levy 
Fiscal 
Disparities 
Distribution 
Levy 
Taconite 
Aid 
Taconite 
Credits 
IRRRB 
Grants 
& Loans 
AITKIN AITKIN 83% 8% 0% 8% 0% 
AITKIN AITKIN TOWN 98% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
AITKIN FARM ISLAND TOWN 99% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
AITKIN FLEMING TOWN 99% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
AITKIN GLEN TOWN 99% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
AITKIN HAZELTON TOWN 99% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
AITKIN KIMBERLY TOWN 99% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
AITKIN LAKESIDE TOWN 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
AITKIN LEE TOWN 99% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
AITKIN LIBBY TOWN 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
AITKIN LOGAN TOWN 98% 1% 0% 1% 0% 
AITKIN MALMO TOWN 99% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
AITKIN MORRISON TOWN 98% 1% 1% 1% 0% 
AITKIN NORDLAND TOWN 99% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
AITKIN PALISADE 76% 12% 0% 12% 0% 
AITKIN SPENCER TOWN 98% 1% 1% 1% 0% 
AITKIN UNORGANIZED AREAS 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
AITKIN VERDON TOWN 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
AITKIN WAUKENABO TOWN 99% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
AITKIN WEALTHWOOD TOWN 99% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
AITKIN WORKMAN TOWN 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
COOK GRAND MARAIS 71% 2% 2% 2% 23% 
COOK LUTSEN TOWN 80% 0% 4% 0% 16% 
COOK SCHROEDER TOWN 87% 0% 13% 0% 0% 
COOK TOFTE TOWN 95% 0% 5% 0% 0% 
COOK UNORGANIZED AREAS 96% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
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(continued) 
 
COUNTY CITY-TOWN NAME 
Local 
Levy 
Fiscal 
Disparities 
Distribution 
Levy 
Taconite 
Aid 
Taconite 
Credits 
IRRRB 
Grants 
& Loans 
CROW WING BAY LAKE TOWN 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
CROW WING CENTER TOWN 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
CROW WING CROSBY 58% 12% 12% 12% 7% 
CROW WING CROSSLAKE 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
CROW WING CUYUNA 95% 2% 0% 2% 0% 
CROW WING DEAN LAKE TOWNSHIP 99% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
CROW WING DEERWOOD 95% 2% 0% 2% 0% 
CROW WING DEERWOOD TOWN 99% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
CROW WING EMILY 96% 0% 0% 0% 4% 
CROW WING FAIRFIELD TOWN 99% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
CROW WING IRONDALE TOWN 92% 2% 4% 2% 0% 
CROW WING IRONTON 55% 17% 10% 17% 0% 
CROW WING LAKE EDWARD TOWN 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
CROW WING LITTLE PINE TOWN 99% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
CROW WING MISSION TOWN 99% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
CROW WING NOKAY LAKE TOWN 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
CROW WING OAK LAWN TOWN 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
CROW WING PELICAN TOWN 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
CROW WING PERRY LAKE TOWN 99% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
CROW WING RABBIT LAKE TOWN 99% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
CROW WING RIVERTON 28% 2% 2% 2% 66% 
CROW WING ROSS LAKE TOWN 99% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
CROW WING TROMMALD 90% 3% 5% 3% 0% 
CROW WING WOLFORD TOWN 99% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
ITASCA ALVWOOD TOWN 97% 0% 3% 0% 0% 
ITASCA ARBO TOWN 95% 1% 3% 1% 0% 
ITASCA ARDENHURST TOWN 96% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
ITASCA BALSAM TOWN 96% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
ITASCA BEARVILLE TOWN 96% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
ITASCA BIGFORK 25% 5% 1% 5% 66% 
ITASCA BIGFORK TOWN 96% 0% 3% 0% 0% 
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ITASCA BLACKBERRY TOWN 96% 0% 3% 0% 0% 
ITASCA BOVEY 51% 13% 10% 13% 14% 
ITASCA CALUMET 34% 12% 8% 12% 34% 
ITASCA CARPENTER TOWN 96% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
ITASCA COHASSET 91% 0% 3% 0% 5% 
ITASCA COLERAINE 83% 3% 7% 3% 4% 
ITASCA EFFIE 79% 10% 2% 10% 0% 
ITASCA FEELEY TOWN 96% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
ITASCA GOOD HOPE TOWN 96% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
ITASCA GOODLAND TOWN 89% 0% 11% 0% 0% 
ITASCA GRAND RAPIDS 76% 5% 2% 5% 12% 
ITASCA GRATTAN TOWN 95% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
ITASCA GREENWAY TOWN 82% 3% 12% 3% 0% 
ITASCA HARRIS TOWN 96% 1% 3% 1% 0% 
ITASCA IRON RANGE TOWN 89% 2% 7% 2% 0% 
ITASCA KEEWATIN 17% 17% 22% 17% 26% 
ITASCA KINGHURST TOWN 96% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
ITASCA LAPRAIRIE 60% 1% 2% 1% 37% 
ITASCA LAWRENCE TOWN 93% 0% 7% 0% 0% 
ITASCA LIBERTY TOWN 96% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
ITASCA LONE PINE TOWN 83% 0% 17% 0% 0% 
ITASCA MARBLE 50% 18% 14% 18% 0% 
ITASCA MAX TOWN 96% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
ITASCA MOOSE PARK TOWN 96% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
ITASCA NASHWAUK 45% 4% 17% 4% 30% 
ITASCA NASHWAUK TOWN 76% 1% 22% 1% 0% 
ITASCA NORE TOWN 97% 0% 3% 0% 0% 
ITASCA POMROY TOWN 96% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
ITASCA SAGO TOWN 96% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
ITASCA SPANG TOWN 96% 0% 3% 0% 0% 
ITASCA SPLITHAND TOWN 95% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
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ITASCA SQUAW LAKE 88% 4% 3% 4% 0% 
ITASCA STOKES TOWN 97% 0% 3% 0% 0% 
ITASCA TACONITE 56% 7% 9% 7% 20% 
ITASCA THIRD RIVER TOWN 96% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
ITASCA TROUT LAKE TOWN 95% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
ITASCA UNORGANIZED AREAS 97% 0% 3% 0% 0% 
ITASCA WABANA TOWN 96% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
ITASCA WARBA 91% 3% 3% 3% 0% 
ITASCA WAWINA TOWN 97% 0% 3% 0% 0% 
ITASCA WILDWOOD TOWN 96% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
KOOCHICHING UNORGANIZED AREAS 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
LAKE BEAVER BAY 94% 0% 5% 0% 0% 
LAKE BEAVER BAY TOWN 87% 0% 13% 0% 0% 
LAKE CRYSTAL BAY TOWN 85% 0% 14% 0% 0% 
LAKE FALL LAKE TOWN 90% 0% 10% 0% 0% 
LAKE SILVER BAY 60% 6% 25% 6% 2% 
LAKE SILVER CREEK TOWN 88% 0% 12% 0% 0% 
LAKE STONY RIVER TOWN 86% 0% 14% 0% 0% 
LAKE TWO HARBORS 38% 3% 2% 3% 54% 
LAKE UNORGANIZED AREAS 91% 0% 9% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS ALANGO TOWN 86% 1% 12% 1% 0% 
ST LOUIS ALBORN TOWN 89% 1% 10% 1% 0% 
ST LOUIS ALDEN TOWN 86% 1% 12% 1% 0% 
ST LOUIS ANGORA TOWN 90% 0% 10% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS ARROWHEAD TOWN 93% 0% 7% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS AULT TOWN 90% 0% 10% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS AURORA 38% 13% 16% 13% 21% 
ST LOUIS BABBITT 45% 4% 31% 4% 15% 
ST LOUIS BALKAN TOWN 80% 2% 16% 2% 0% 
ST LOUIS BASSETT TOWN 84% 0% 16% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS BEATTY TOWN 93% 0% 7% 0% 0% 
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ST LOUIS BIWABIK 74% 2% 9% 2% 14% 
ST LOUIS BIWABIK TOWN 81% 1% 17% 1% 0% 
ST LOUIS BREITUNG TOWN 92% 0% 7% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS BREVATOR TOWN 93% 0% 7% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS BROOKSTON 83% 6% 6% 6% 0% 
ST LOUIS BUHL 21% 11% 15% 11% 42% 
ST LOUIS CAMP 5 TOWN 92% 0% 8% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS CEDAR VALLEY TOWN 88% 0% 11% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS CHERRY TOWN 85% 1% 13% 1% 0% 
ST LOUIS CHISHOLM 22% 14% 13% 14% 39% 
ST LOUIS CLINTON TOWN 78% 1% 19% 1% 0% 
ST LOUIS COLVIN TOWN 90% 0% 10% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS COOK 63% 5% 3% 5% 24% 
ST LOUIS COTTON TOWN 90% 0% 9% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS CRANE LAKE TOWN 94% 0% 6% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS CULVER TOWN 87% 1% 10% 1% 0% 
ST LOUIS DULUTH TOWN 89% 0% 10% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS EAGLES NEST TOWN 92% 0% 8% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS ELLSBURG TOWN 92% 0% 8% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS ELMER TOWN 84% 0% 15% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS ELY 61% 8% 13% 8% 10% 
ST LOUIS EMBARRASS TOWN 76% 4% 12% 4% 5% 
ST LOUIS EVELETH 17% 10% 13% 10% 51% 
ST LOUIS FAIRBANKS TOWN 91% 0% 9% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS FAYAL TOWN 80% 1% 18% 1% 0% 
ST LOUIS FIELD TOWN 88% 0% 11% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS FRENCH TOWN 88% 0% 12% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS GILBERT 35% 11% 14% 11% 29% 
ST LOUIS GREAT SCOTT TOWN 75% 0% 25% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS GREENWOOD TOWN 92% 0% 8% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS HIBBING 46% 6% 16% 6% 26% 
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ST LOUIS HOYT LAKES 58% 2% 21% 2% 16% 
ST LOUIS INDUSTRIAL TOWN 86% 1% 11% 1% 0% 
ST LOUIS IRON JUNCTION 79% 4% 13% 4% 0% 
ST LOUIS KABETOGAMA TOWN 93% 0% 7% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS KELSEY TOWN 89% 0% 10% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS KINNEY 30% 23% 24% 23% 0% 
ST LOUIS KUGLER TOWN 87% 1% 12% 1% 0% 
ST LOUIS LAVELL TOWN 92% 0% 8% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS LEIDING TOWN 91% 0% 9% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS LEONIDAS 40% 10% 40% 10% 0% 
ST LOUIS LINDEN GROVE TOWN 88% 0% 11% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS MCDAVITT TOWN 64% 0% 35% 0% 1% 
ST LOUIS MCKINLEY 30% 24% 18% 24% 4% 
ST LOUIS MEADOWLANDS 52% 23% 2% 23% 0% 
ST LOUIS MEADOWLANDS TOWN 87% 1% 11% 1% 0% 
ST LOUIS MORCOM TOWN 89% 0% 10% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS MORSE TOWN 91% 0% 9% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS MOUNTAIN IRON 50% 2% 30% 2% 16% 
ST LOUIS NESS TOWN 89% 0% 11% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS NEW INDEPENDENCE TOWN 89% 0% 11% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS NORTHLAND TOWN 91% 0% 9% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS ORR 58% 5% 3% 5% 29% 
ST LOUIS OWENS TOWN 88% 0% 11% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS PEQUAYWAN TOWN 90% 0% 10% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS PIKE TOWN 83% 1% 14% 1% 0% 
ST LOUIS PORTAGE TOWN 92% 0% 8% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS SANDY TOWN 80% 1% 17% 1% 0% 
ST LOUIS STONEY BROOK TOWN 84% 1% 15% 1% 0% 
ST LOUIS STURGEON TOWN 88% 0% 11% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS TOIVOLA TOWN 90% 0% 10% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS TOWER 48% 2% 5% 2% 43% 
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ST LOUIS UNORGANIZED AREAS 93% 0% 7% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS VERMILION LAKE TOWN 90% 0% 10% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS VIRGINIA 44% 7% 15% 7% 28% 
ST LOUIS WAASA TOWN 85% 0% 15% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS WHITE TOWN 68% 2% 20% 2% 8% 
ST LOUIS WILLOW VALLEY TOWN 88% 0% 12% 0% 0% 
ST LOUIS WINTON 72% 12% 4% 12% 0% 
ST LOUIS WUORI TOWN 66% 1% 33% 1% 0% 
 
